As COP 31 moves into its second week in Antalya, one item handed up from the subsidiary bodies looks technical but carries more weight than its title suggests. The Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism has finalised voluntary guidelines to help countries collect and manage loss and damage data for their biennial transparency reports (BTRs), a task handed to it by the first global stocktake. With the second round of BTRs due at the end of this year, now is the time for India to consider what its own loss and damage reporting could look like next time.
Reporting on loss and damage is voluntary. The transparency guidelines allow any interested Party to report on three things: observed and projected climate impacts, activities to avert, minimise and address loss and damage, and the institutional arrangements behind those activities. India is not starting from zero. Its first BTR carried a dedicated loss and damage section that follows the three-part structure of the transparency guidelines. It surveys the main hazards using material from the National Disaster Management Authority, gives a state-wise table of flood-affected area for 1998-2022 from the National Remote Sensing Centre, and tabulates deaths, crop area affected, property damaged and animal deaths from weather disasters in 2022-2024. Activities are then listed scheme by scheme, followed by a detailed account of the institutional framework under the Disaster Management Act, 2005.
The guidelines’ own review of the first BTRs lists India among the countries that reported impacts in seven of the nine loss categories it identifies: economic and GDP losses, livelihoods and jobs, agriculture, livestock and fisheries, infrastructure, life and health, and biodiversity. The two categories in which India does not appear are telling. One is land and water resources, which covers permanent land loss from sea-level rise and erosion, salinisation and falling water levels. The other is social cohesion and culture, which covers lost cultural sites, traditional knowledge and community ties. The first of these gaps is perhaps surprising, given India’s long engagement on land issues under the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), from hosting COP14 in New Delhi in 2019 and pledging to restore 26 million hectares of degraded land by 2030, to its call at COP17 in Ulaanbaatar this year for drought to be managed as a predictable risk. Indian Space Research Organisation’s (ISRO’s) Desertification and Land Degradation Atlas, which records 29.7 per cent of India’s geographical area as undergoing degradation in 2018-19, already offers a body of evidence this category could draw on. Linking the two reporting processes may be a natural step for future BTRs.

India already has much of the data infrastructure the guidelines describe. BTR-1 describes a National Disaster Management Information System (NDMIS) that tracks spending from the disaster response funds and captures damage and loss data reported by states. For Sendai Framework reporting, mortality is drawn from the health ministry’s Health Management Information System, and economic and infrastructure losses are estimated with the Ministry of Finance using UNDRR’s indicator methods. Yet the damage table in BTR-1 does not come from these systems. Its source is a compilation by Down To Earth and the Centre for Science and Environment, built from the India Meteorological Department’s disaster records and media reports, and it reports physical counts without monetary values. Since official data systems already exist, the obvious next step is to make them the source of the BTR’s loss figures, in money as well as in counts.
The Sixteenth Finance Commission has pushed in exactly this direction. It recommends turning NDMIS into a comprehensive system that captures transaction-level disaster data as a single source of information, and it makes complete, validated NDMIS data a condition for states’ disaster management grants from 2027-28. If that condition holds, India’s future BTR could rest on far better loss data than its first.
A second problem is coverage. Official damage statements often concentrate on public infrastructure, crops, livestock and houses; losses to private industrial assets and the knock-on effects through supply chains are largely absent. When we added those indirect effects through a regional input-output model, the 2018 cyclones in Andhra Pradesh turned out to have cost the state 1.53 per cent of its output that year, a figure that the official damage statements alone would not reveal. Our newer national estimate takes the economy-wide view further. It traces five climate stresses (rainfall variability, floods, drought, heat and sea-level rise) through fourteen sectoral pathways and puts the economic impact of climate change at 7.38 per cent of GDP in 2022-23, rising to 15.42 per cent by 2050 under a moderate-emissions scenario. Heat emerges as a major source of damage through labour productivity, health and electricity. These are modelled damage costs, the losses that would arise without adaptation, rather than losses already recorded, and they leave out cyclones. Even so, the distance between them and a table of physical counts shows how much official loss reporting misses. A loss and damage section built only on official damage statements will therefore understate what climate change is already costing.
Of the four ways the guidelines suggest for organising reported activities, the most comprehensive is the risk and response management framework from the Executive Committee’s own Compendium. It groups measures under five connected headings: pre-emptive action, contingency arrangements, managing impacts, transformative action and governance. Its appeal for a BTR is that a country can map what it already does, drawing on its disaster risk reduction strategies, climate policies, financing instruments, response systems and post-disaster assessments, into a format other Parties will recognise.

BTR-1 already contains the beginnings of such a mapping, though in the simpler language of averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage. Its institutional section describes disaster risk reduction as the means of minimising loss and damage, and response and recovery as the means of addressing residual impacts. It then sets out the Finance Commission’s 80:20 split between response and mitigation funds as the financial mechanism. What it does not yet do is organise the reported activities, or the money behind them, along those lines; the activities appear as a list of schemes. The Sixteenth Finance Commission has kept the split for 2026-31. Of the ₹2,04,401 crore earmarked for state funds, ₹1,63,521 crore goes to the State Disaster Response Funds and ₹40,880 crore to the State Disaster Mitigation Funds, and preparedness and capacity-building have moved from the response funds into the mitigation funds. These windows map readily onto the framework: the mitigation funds onto pre-emptive action, and the response funds, which are set aside in advance and released when disaster strikes, onto contingency arrangements and managing impacts. Reporting the next BTR’s activities and expenditure along these fund windows would turn a framing India already states into a structure tied to audited public accounts and comparable from one BTR to the next.
A final gap concerns non-economic losses. BTR-1 itself acknowledges that they receive insufficient attention, which limits comprehensive impact assessment, and it lists their explicit accounting among its priorities for the future. Slow-onset losses are just as hard to capture: our national estimate could value sea-level rise only through the loss of coastal wetlands, and it identifies the absence of sector-level econometric evidence on how sea-level rise moves through the economy as a critical gap in India’s evidence base. Other countries’ experience points to practical routes, as documented in the voluntary guidelines. Bhutan held consultations in all 20 of its districts to define national loss signatures, documenting non-economic losses such as threats to sacred landscapes and traditional knowledge, and Cabo Verde added climate and disaster modules to its national household survey. An Indian version of either is easy to imagine: disaster-exposure questions in existing national surveys, and structured documentation of losses in Himalayan, coastal and tribal communities where slow-onset change is already reshaping land, water and other ways of life.
(Views expressed are the author’s own and do not reflect those of ICRIER)
